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The word „law” is the translation of the word „jus”, which, in its turn, comes from 
the Sanskrit „jaos”. In Sanskrit, „jaos” means something which is required or 
allowed according to a moral-social rule. The word was also taken over with this 
sense in the Latin language, hence the expression „righteous”, in the sense of 
„holy”, „good” etc. In fact, the word „jus” (law) was also taken over, with the same 
moral value, of a metaphysical nature, in the Romanian language but, later on, its 
original sense was replaced, so that the word justice acquired the meaning of 
conformity with the legal provisions, also referring to an amount of norms which 
regulate the social relationships between individuals. 
Initially, by the word „justitia / ae”, the Romans have also expressed a value of a 
moral nature, assessing, in fact, what is „justi atquae injusti” (just and unjust) 
(Ulpianus). With time, this moral principle was also acompanied by a principle of a 
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juridical nature, so that the word „justitia / ae” came to enclose both a moral and a 
juridical principle. By the enforcement of this moral and juridical principle, the 
Romans aimed „to give everybody what they deserved” (suum cuique tribuere), 
thus, respecting every person`s rights by the enforcemenrt of an „aequitas / tis” 
(equity), and not of an absolute „justice”. 
By Romanians, the ontic relation between law and morals, between what is 
„righteous” and „good”, between law and religion (Dură, 2003, pp. 15-23) was also 
emphasized by the fact that the distribution of justice itself was made in the name 
of „the holy law”, implicitly considered a direct emanation of the divine will. 
Therefore, it`s not surprising that for the Romanian legislator – from the age before 
the secularization of sacred law, that is, in the time of Voivode Cuza, – „direptatea” 
(justice) was perceived and defined as „a thing which is holier that everything” (the 
Nomocanon of Târgovişte, 1652). 
By „human rights”, we can understand everything which is required and allowed 
by a man according to some moral norms, with a social or juridical character, 
hence the different nature of these rights, which are both based on „jus naturale” 
and on „jus gentium”, and on the rules of moral conduct admitted and practised in a 
democratic society, where the humanistic values are asserted and promoted. The 
rights that the law recognizes to individuals in the context of social life are defined 
as liberties, hence their diversity (e.g. freedom of opinion, religious liberty etc.). 
Anyhow, these human rights and liberties have changed with every age because of 
the ideological concepts about the world and life, hence the different perception – 
in the European juridical thinking – regarding the implementation method of the 
human rights` juridical protection. 
Etymologically, the word „protection” comes from the Latin word „protectio-onis” 
and it means „defence”, „protection”, „preservation”. By the juridical protection of 
human rights we refer to the totality of juridical norms and concrete measures 
taken by the world`s states in order to defend the human being and, ipso facto, for 
the fulfillment of the man`s spiritual and material life. The Romanian Law – up to 
the Revolution of December 1989 – didn`t refer to human rights, but to the rights 
of „citizens” (Drăganu, 1972, p. 209) (Muraru, 1973, pp. 35-108) (Prisca, 1974, pp. 
207-274), emphasizing, this way, the dependence of the Romanian juridical 
thinking on the French one, the genesis of which goes back to the age of the 
Revolution of 1789. At that time, in the year 1789, the European, religious „man” 
(either Catholic or Protestant), was replaced by the citizen, the man of a city where 
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„liberty, equality and fraternity” among „individuals” or „citizens” with the same 
political and social status had to rule. Of course, through such a political and 
juridical thinking, the human beings, the men, have been not only depersonalized, 
but also brought to a state of equalitarianism. 
This social concept, which aimed at the leveling, the equalization of consumption 
and of the lifestyle of the members of the French society, has also imposed a 
secularization, pushed up to a trial to desecrate the French society, which actually 
ended up in the spreading of an atheistical ideology, in which agnosticism and the 
fight against the religious-moral faiths and values, - especially against the Roman-
Catholic Church, the institution which, for the Revolution of 1789, embodied the 
Medieval, oppressive spirit – found devout promoters and supporters among the 
followers of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
As a conclusion, the man was ideologically and juridically conceived as a servant 
of the city and his rights and liberties were also included in the sphere of a thinking 
of a preeminently ideological, of a party-minded nature, with negative 
consequences also within the human relationships, at the basis of which the very 
reason of these rights and liberties lacked, namely the „communion”, the only 
carrier of the effects of interior freedom, namely of conscience, of faith and 
religion. 
Among the historical ideologies, which left aside the interior freedom of man, there 
was also „the communist ideology, which tends to immerse the human person in 
the anonymous mass of nature and to talk about equality and collective rights...”. In 
this sense, „... neither equality, nor liberty are important, but the communion or the 
personal relationships between people”, because „the man was neither created for 
the collectivist equality, nor for the individualistic freedom, but for his communion 
with God within the Holy Trinity”. (Popescu, 2004, pp. 18-19) 
Mircea Eliade wrote – in the year 1964 – that „... the secular is nothing but a new 
manifestation of the same constitutive structure of man (de l'homme), which, 
earlier, has manifested itself through sacred expressions (par des expressions 
sacrées)”. (Eliade, 1965, p. 13) „... The religious man (l'homme religieux) – the 
same historian of religions said – can only live in a sacred world, because only 
such a world can participate to the being, can exist in reality. This religious 
neccesity expresses an unquenchable ontological thirst. The religious man is 
craving for existence .... For the religious man, the secular space represents the 
absolute non-being ... . The profound nostalgia of the religious man is that of living 
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in a „divine world, ..., as it has been depicted in temples and sanctuaries later on. 
As a conclusion, this religious nostalgia expresses the wish to live in a pure and 
holy Cosmos, as it was in the beginning, when it came out of the Creator`s hands” 
(Eliade, 1965, pp. 61-62). The same historian of religions wrote that „... the 
experience of the sacred is that which creates the world, and the most elementary 
religion is, above all, an ontology”, hence the justified observation that „any 
existential crisis is, to a great extent, „religious”, because, at the archaic levels of 
culture, the being mixes with the sacred” (Eliade, 1965, p. 178). In the end, Mircea 
Eliade concluded that only religion is the one which ensures „the integrity” of „an 
existence which creates the values”. (Eliade, 1965, p. 180) 
That this thing is real is also certified by the demiurgic work of Constantin 
Brâncuşi. A pioneering work in modern art, it cannot be understood in its entirety 
and complexity without a direct reference to Christian symbolism, to that sacred 
metaphysics expressed by certain names that the sculptor of Hobiţa himself has 
chosen for his works: The Beginning of the World, The Red Sea Crossing, Adam 
and Eve, The Prodigal Son, The Last Supper, the Table of Silence etc. In fact, his 
work itself – as, for example, The Masterly Bird or Bird in Space, – „... strives for, 
craves for the transcendent. At Brâncuşi – a great exegete of his work noticed – 
everything is „elevation”, „sublimation”, „overcoming one`s limits”, thirst of 
freedom and redemption. Even in the making-up of the Sculptural Ensemble of 
Târgu-Jiu, the unrivalled masterpiece of the Brancusian art, competent researchers 
have decoded Christian-Evangelical intuitions and meanings, ...” (Cârlugea, 2006, 
p. 32), indeed „The Table of Silence” also has an „apostolic conotation”; „The 
Column of Endless Memory”..., as the artist himself once used to call it, ..., 
suggests „the .. sacrificial veneration ...” and „Stairway to Heaven”, which reminds 
us of „the one of John the Climax from the frescos of Suceviţa Monastery, of the 
Tree of Life and the centre of the world, of the bond between earth and heaven, 
between the man and God, ...” (Cârlugea, 2006, p. 32) 
For he who has a religious faith, the Nature „is always filled with a religious value” 
and the „world remains imbued with sacrality” (Eliade, 1965, p. 101). In this sense, 
in the name of that sacrality of the world and of the respective religious value of 
„Nature”, of „the Cosmos”, „homo religiosus” is also a promoter and defender of 
the man`s right to religion. Such a „homo religiosus” was also the „great” 
Brâncuşi, who also proved to be a sacerdot of human rights. 
JURIDICA 
 
157 
Intolerance and ignorance in matters of religion, displayed both by the ones who 
are hostile to the right to religious freedom and by the ones who kill in the name of 
God, are vectors leading to „... a war of peoples` mentalities and cultures”1 (Dură, 
2003, p. 23). Hence, the obligation of the human society to avoid any kind of 
existential crisis, of a religious nature and to ensure the „integrity” of a human 
pluralistic existence, „one which creates the values” (spiritual, religious, 
intellectual, cultural, economic etc.), imbued with sacrality, as this is the only one 
able to eliminate any kind of „war” of religions or civilizations. 
The internationalization of human rights was made through „The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly, through the Resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948. As 
one can notice from the very title of this international, fundamental document – 
using the word „universal” instead of the word „international” – the rights included 
in this Declaration „do not belong to the citizens, but to individuals, as human 
beings” (Predescu, 2006, p. 34). Indeed, only the man is created for the 
universality, not the citizen that the French Revolution refered to. The exegetes of 
this international document noticed that its text „starts from the necessity of 
recognising a minimal standard of human rights, to be universally respected and of 
establishing a common conception regarding the human rights and liberties” 
(Predescu, 2006, p. 34). 
The obligation to respect and put into practice the provisions stated by the text of 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was explicitly restated by the United 
Nations` Conference of 1968, which solemnly proclaimed that the respective 
Declaration „represents an obligation for the members of the international 
community”.(O.N.U., 1995, p. 14) 
In Romania of the years 1947-1989, as regards the enumeration and classification 
of human rights – both by the Constitution and by the respective laws, and by the 
juridical handbooks and treaties, also conditioned by the party-minded ideology of 
those times – the model offered by the European legislation was followed in a 
„grosso modo” manner. That is why they also mentioned „rights” which could not 
be observed in the Romania of that age. For example, they mentioned „the citizens` 
right to personal property”, „social-political rights and liberties” (e.g. voting rights, 
the right of association etc.), „the freedom of the press, of gatherings, of 
demonstrations and meetings”, „rights referring to inviolabilities” (the inviolability 
                                               
1
 Interview taken by Mrs. Irina Budeanu to prof. N. V. Dură. 
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of the person, the inviolability of the home, the secret of the correspondence), „the 
right of the person who was damaged in one of his rights by an illegal act of a state 
organ to require to the competent organs the cancelation of the respective act and 
the compensation of the prejudice” etc. Not to mention the religious liberty, also 
provided by the texts of the Constitutions of 1948, 1952 and 1965, but which, in 
fact, was censored and, sometimes, even abrogated. 
In the handbooks and treaties of constitutional law –published after December 
1989 – they also talk about „the rights and liberties of citizens” or of those of 
„Romanian citizens” (Muraru, 1995, p. 186), and not of human rights. In fact, their 
authors define „the fundamental rights” established by the juridical norms as 
„subjective rights belonging to citizens, established by the Constitution and by 
laws”. (Muraru, 1995, p. 189) 
Anyhow, the same Romanian constitutionalists tell us that „the expressions human 
rights and citizen rights” are „expressions in a tight correlation, which refer to the 
same field and which, though, nevertheless, cannot be mistaken to one another, in a 
rigorous juridical terminology. The expression human rights refers to the rights of 
the human being, whose natural rights are recognised, as indefeasible and 
imprescriptible rights … His natural rights are proclaimed and granted by the 
Constitution of the state whose citizen he is, getting thus life and juridical 
efficiency, under the name of civil rights (liberties)” (Muraru, 1995, pp. 190-191). 
For the respective constitutionalists, the phrase „human rights” evokes, therefore, 
the „rights of the human being”, and, more precisely, his natural rights, which are 
indefeasible and imprescriptible rights. But, by their enactment and their 
enforcement through the constitutional law, these natural rights become civil rights.  
„If citizens, in principle, benefit from all the rights provided by the Constitution, 
foreigners and stateless persons – a constitutionalist wrote – only benefit from 
some of them …” (Muraru, 1995, p. 191). So, the foreigners and stateless persons 
do not benefit from the same rights provided by the law as the citizens of a State. In 
this sense, by the limitation of these rights – in case of foreigners and stateless 
persons – the principle of the human persons` equality before law, provided by the 
regulations of the European Union (acc. to Art. 20, The Treaty of Nissa, 2000) is 
no longer respected. Finally, the same constitutionalists tell us that „… from a 
juridical point of view, the right is a liberty and the liberty a right”, and, 
consequently, from a juridical point of view, there are no „differences between 
right and liberty.” (Muraru, 1995, p. 190) 
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For the European jurists, human rights are „an amount of rights which condition, at 
the same time, the man`s freedom, his dignity and the development of his 
personality, soaring to an unsatisfied ideal“(Pouille & Roche, 2002, p. 6). In its 
turn, „liberty” is defined as „a value, an ideal that humans try to 
appropriate“(Pontier, 2001, p. 9). The jurists ask themselves if „the liberties are 
necessarily rights too”. In the opinion of some people, they are „objective 
exigencies, that do not lack juridical extensions, but that cannot be qualified by 
subjective rights, that is, by the power to impose, to ask or to forbid … The 
departing point of any reflection on the relations between freedom and law (or 
rights) seems to us to be ... – a French jurist wrote – in the natural law, that is, in 
some kind of idealism” (Madiot, 1991, p. 17). So, in the opinion of some jurists, 
„liberties” are not „subjective rights”, and, as such, any reflection on the relation 
between liberty and law finds a refuge in the natural law. However, the respective 
jurists do not mention the fact that both the man`s rights and his liberties have their 
origin and juridical basis in this „jus naturale” itself, which, above all, provides the 
right to life and the right to liberty and safety of every human being.  
Once the natural liberty became political liberty, the individual`s will shall be 
determined by the social order. By this political freedom – as a liberty within the 
social order – we point to „the individual`s self-determination through his 
participation in the creation of the social order. Political liberty - Hans Kelsen 
wrote - is liberty and liberty is autonomy. (Kelsen, 1997, p. 334) 
Human rights are usually classified as civil, political, social, economic and cultural 
rights or as individual and collective rights (Rouget, 2000, p. 61). They also talk 
about „the international juridical status of the individual”, which „comprises the 
ensemble of rights that the individual should have in order to maximize his abilities 
both at a personal and collective level.” (Tousard, 2000, p. 393). Among the 
fundamental human rights and liberties, „religious liberties” take a special place 
(Diaconu, 1998, p. 101). According to Article 4 of the „International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights" – adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
December 16, 1966, coming into force on March 23, 1976, - the States can`t waive 
the religious rights and liberties even “in case that an extraordinary public danger 
threathens the nation`s existence…”.  
For some jurists, „… the protection of religious identity appears as a component 
part of the protection of the identity of the persons belonging to minorities and of 
minorities on the whole” (Diaconu, 1998, p. 108). Indeed, this protection of 
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religious identity, also tells upon the persons belonging to national (or ethnical) 
minorities, hence the necessity of some juridical regulations – international and 
national – regarding the religious rights and liberties, but it cannot be limited only 
to the persons who belong to national minorities, as this protection of religious 
identity is necessary for all the members of the human society who share and 
express a religious faith, irrespective of their ethnical origin and of their majority or 
minority status. 
The European Court of Human Rights has also emphasized the fact that religious 
liberty „is crucial for a democratic society, and that the religious dimension is an 
essential element for pluralistic society” (Diaconu, 1998, p. 113). The same Court 
has cancelled many decisions of condemnation for proselytism pronounced by the 
jurisdictions of some countries – such as Greece, for example - in the case of some 
Jehovists, invoking the respect owed to the freedom of thought, of conscience and 
of religion of other people, provided by the Article 9 of the Convention for the 
Defense of Human Rights. (Berger, 1998, pp. 419-425) 
Taking these obvious realities into account, we have therefore one more reason to 
believe that, in the future, these religious rights and liberties – provided by the text 
of the international and national legislation and documentation – shall also become 
the main subject of hermeneutical study and analysis in the Romanian Law 
Schools. 
By signing the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Liberties on October 7, 1993, in the very day of its joining the Council of Europe, 
„Romania turned the page of totalitarianism and made its entrance in the club of 
European democracies. By ratifying the respective Convention on June 20 1994, 
Romania recognized – a French jurist wrote – to any person belonging to its 
jurisdiction the rights and liberties defined in this instrument and, at the same time, 
by accepting the right to individual last appeal to the European Commission of 
Human Rights, it subscribed - Vincent Berger concluded – to an international and 
even supranational control system. This way, it accepted the obligations that follow 
from this and the discipline resulting from this”. (Berger, 1998, p. IX) 
Beyond doubt, the country`s Constitution will be the one that shall prove us - first 
of all – if Romania has recognised or not recognised the rights and liberties defined 
in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and in the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties to any person belonging to 
its jurisdiction. Therefore, the text of the Romanian Constitution shall be subject to 
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a careful examination, so that we could realize, this way, the extent to which it does 
or does not defend the human rights provided in the international documents and 
norms. The Romanian constitutionalists write that „… not only the provisions of 
international pacts and conventions that Romania is party to can substantiate the 
constitutionality or, if the case, the non-constitutionality of a legal provision, but 
also the recommendations, with the sole difference that the latter, being 
uncompulsory, exclusively have – just as the doctrine, for example, - the value 
represented by the force of the ideas they comprise. The recommendation, by itself, 
cannot justify or nullify the constitutionality of a law text, but it can contribute to 
the clarification of the meaning of a constitutional provision upon which the 
establishment of the constitutional legitimacy of that text depends”. (Muraru & 
Constantinescu, 1995, p. 206) 
Thus, we shall keep in mind that both the international Pacts and Conventions and 
the Recommendations can substantiate the constitutionality or non-constitutionality 
of a legal provision. As such, these normative, international acts (Treaties, Pacts 
and Conventions), including the Recommendations, can also substantiate the 
constitutionality or non-constitutionality of a legal provision regarding the human 
rights and liberties in Romania. 
The European politologists and jurists talk about „a politics” of human rights, 
which the European Union has to implement in a constant and coherent manner. In 
their opinion, „... a European politics of human rights is not only compatible with 
the principle of subsidiarity, but it is, to a certain extent, a necessity resulting from 
this principle” (Ph. & Weiler, 2001, p. 28). About „the principle of subsidiarity”, 
mentioned in the European Convention on Human Rights, signed on November 4, 
1950, in Rome, - it was said that this „implies the recognition of national 
autonomy…; the national authorities remain free to choose the measures they 
consider to be the most appropriate for putting their conventional obligations into 
practice”. (Sudre, 1990, p. 38) 
The principle of subsidiarity, which also implies the observance of the national 
sovereignity of every member state of the European Union, also finds the 
expression of its complete assertion in the provisions of international regulations 
regarding human rights. For example, the Charter of the European Union provides 
that „the Union contributes to the preservation and development of common values 
(human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity etc. n.n.), observing the diversity of 
cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe, as well as of the national identity 
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(de l'identité nationale) of the member states and concerning the organization of 
their public powers at a national (au niveau national), regional and local level.” 
In the opinion of some European jurists, „law, which was based on the protection 
of the individual against the power, has become a simple instrument of action, an 
instrument at the states`s disposal. From this point of view – they specify – the 
crisis of the state is real and profound” (Madiot, 1991, p. 3). But, we can say that 
this crisis was overcome just by the joining of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which, indeed, has to be seen as „a starting point 
towards the Union`s future”. (Schutter, 2002, p. 205) 
Beyond doubt, the legitimacy of the European Union States can be claimed and 
justified, first of all, by the protection of human rights. That is why, not 
accidentally, the „Status of the Charter of Human Rights”1 (Rochère, 2002, p. 23) 
was among the main issues examined in the year 2004 by the fora of the European 
Union. Among the objectives pursued by the Union is also the one to „strenghten 
the protection of the member States` rights and interests by the establishment of a 
citizenship of the Union …” (Art. B)2. Article F, par. 2, of the Treaty of Maastricht 
(February 7, 1992), explicitely provides that „the Union respects the fundamental 
rights, as they are ensured by the European Convention on the human fundamental 
rights and liberties which was signed in Rome, on November 4, 1950 and as they 
result from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, as general 
principles of community law”. 
Therefore, the general principles of community law – provided by the European 
Convention – can also be found in the constitutional traditions of the European 
Union`s member States. Therefore, not by chance, the protection of individual 
rights – provided by this Convention - is associated with the protection of the 
state`s interests. In fact, the jurists have noticed that „the originary control system 
of the European Convention” consists in the fact that, „although it opened a breach 
in the fortress of the states` sovereignity, it strives though, at the same time, to 
protect the individual rights and to spare the states` interests”. (Sudre, 1990, p. 9) 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the human rights have 
been the object of examination and protection since the year 1945 (Singh, 1986, pp. 
                                               
1
 The four issues are: a) the delimitation of competencies; b) the Status of the Charter of Human 
Rights; c) the simplification of the treaties; d) the role of national parliaments in the European 
architecture. 
2
 The Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, Art. B. 
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26-38). However, the human rights were mentioned for the first time at the 
International Court „in an individual opinion” of a judge in the year 1947. (Goy, 
2002, p. 12) 
According to Hans Kelsen, „the sources of the law, which have a binding force, are 
the juridical norms; these are the only law” (Kelsen, 1997, p. 206). In this sense, in 
the case of the European legislation, the Conventions, Treaties, Acts and 
Documents resulting from the meetings of the bodies of the European Community 
and of the European Union bodies also have binding force. Some jurists consider 
that the appeal to the general principles of community law is not absolutely 
necessary in order to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, given that they 
are ensured and protected by the constitutional norms of every member state of the 
European Union. Of course, in this case, we could say that the norms resulting 
from the Europeam Convention on Human Rights - as they are interpreted by the 
Strasbourg Court – the community norms and the general principles of community 
law „are only a category of norms likely to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights; …”. (Favoreu, 2000, p. 79) 
The Declaration of Human Rights – promulgated by the General Assembly on 
August 26, 1789 - „… is neither a code, nor a programme, but a symbol, a 
revealing token of the relation between the Power and the Person, which is the 
primary political relation” (Marx, 1989, p. 50). This Declaration, which, after three 
years, was also explicitely mentioned in the Constitution of September 3, 1791, 
remains indeed a symbol of the fight for the citizen`s emancipation from the yoke 
of State power, but not a proper “Charter” of human fundamental rights and 
liberties and, the less so, a main reference in this field, as some politologists, 
jurists, sociologists, philosophers etc still erroneously state. 
They said that „the State`s existence is linked to the existence of individuals, 
subjects to a juridical order and not to the existence of citizens. If the nature of 
citizenship is that of being the condition of an ensemble of rights and obligations, 
we have to stress that these are in no way essential for the juridical system which 
we call State …. only the democratic countries, for example, grant political rights 
to their citizens” (Kelsen, 1997, p. 291). Hence, H. Kelsen`s conclusion that 
citizenship is no necessary institution. 
At the beginning of the XIV-th century, Guillaume d’Ocham inaugurated the 
individualistic tradition in philosophy and law (Villey, 1983, p. 119), 
foreshadowing this way „the individual`s Copernican revolution” (Laurent, 1983, 
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pp. 2-3). Consequently, the ancient vision of the world, of the Cosmos, that 
encompassed all the creatures, subduing them to the order established by the 
Creator, was replaced by the doctrine of individualism. For Ocham only the 
individuals have a real existence, that is the human beings that can be designated 
by a name, hence the doctrine known under the name of nominalism. Presented in a 
new lecture of the Bible, the individualism asserted by nominalism will go hand in 
hand with the subjectivism so attached to rationalism and to the philosophy of the 
“Illuminism”. 
The Reformation and the Renaissance will turn the individual into an autonomous 
subject, practicing the free examination of the Holy Scripts and being responsible 
for himself for achieving his redemption and not by the intercession of the Church. 
The vision about the man had also to change in the juridical field, where „the law 
appears, according to the precepts of the Decalogue, as an order of an authority, as 
the expression of a subjective will and not as a principle that we have to discover 
by observing the surrounding world; the law is conceived… as a subjective law”. 
(Lochak, 2002, pp. 11-12) 
By the representation of law as an expression of the divine will, they also confered 
a first status of universality to the human rights, the assertion, assurance and 
protection of which were explicitely provided by the divine law itself, hence the 
contribution of religious law to the defense of human „dignity” (dignitatis) since 
Antiquity. 
For those who are following the rules of natural law, „human rights are natural and 
they are being imposed on a universal scale. The man knows these rights through 
the exercise of his natural reason. (Bruyer, 1984, pp. 24-25) 
In the VI-th century, A.D., the authors of a juridical manual – drafted by order of 
Emperor Justinian (527-565) – wrote that „jus naturale” (natural law) is „vetustius 
jus” (the older law), that nature has created once with the humanity (quod cum ipso 
genere humano rerum natura prodidit), whereas the civil law came into being once 
with the establishment of the cities, with the election of the magistrates and with 
the enactment of the laws (civilia enim iura tunc coeperunt esse, cum et civitates 
condi et magistratus creari et leges scribi coeperunt). 
Natural law was created once with „mankind”, hence its ancienty and preeminency 
over the civil law, which shall appear once with the emergence of cities. Gradually, 
though, the natural and civil law will harmonize their provisions, as it is the case 
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today with the international, European law and with the national law, especially 
concerning the assertion, assurance and juridical protection of human rights.  
For the distinguished scholars of the juridical studies from the age of the Emperor 
Justinian (527-565) – who talked of „the moral elevation of our times” (dignum 
temporum nostrorum) (Just. Just., lb. I, XXII) – the word „man”, refers to „the 
whole mankind (homines appellaremur) (Just. Just., lb. I, V, 1). Of course, in this 
case, we ask ourselves who is that „alterum” (other), to whom we have to give 
what he deserves „secundum naturam” (according to the very nature of things), 
namely, according to „jus naturale”?! Beyond doubt, nobody else than „the man”, 
our fellow man, who – according to the Judeo-Christian law – is the creature and 
the image of God.  
For the „jus gentium” (the law of the gentiles) – the ancestor of present-day 
international law – there were „tria genera hominum” (three categories of people), 
namely: a) „liberi” (the free people); b) „servi” (the slaves) and c) „libertini” (the 
liberated people) (Jus. Inst. Lib. I, V, 1). Therefore, this classification or division of 
people in social categories is a creation of the „law of the gentiles” (juris gentium) 
and not of natural law, according to which all people are born equal. 
Pointing out the fact that „... it is to the state`s (rei publicae) advantage” that the 
individual does not abuse of his right (ne quis re sua male utatur) (Just. Inst., lb. I, 
VII, 2), the Roman jurisconsults also wanted to add the specification that „civilis 
ratio civilia quidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia vero non utique” (the civil 
law can nullify/abrogate the civil rights, but not the ones pertaining to natural law) 
(Just. Inst., lb. I, XV, 3). 
So, the political, the civil rights etc. cannot abrogate the rights enacted by the 
natural law, to which also the right to religious freedom belongs. 
The same jurisconsults of Emperor Justinian wrote that „... libertas inestimabilis 
est” (liberty is a priceless good). That is why the Roman jurisprudence considered 
that a person could introduce an action „as a representative, tutor or trustee” and 
„pro libertate” (for the defense of liberty) (Just. Inst., lb. IV, X). 
Based on the same „naturali ratione” (natural reason), this jurisprudence decided 
that a master could „libertatem in testamento dare servo suo” (grant the freedom to 
his slave) as soon as he reached „septimum et decimum annum” (seventeen years of 
age), and not at „viginti annis” (twenty years), as the „ancient” (antiquitas) Roman 
law provided (Just. Inst., lb. I, VI, 7). 
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According to the Roman jurisconsults, this „natural law” (jus naturale) „is not 
peculiar to mankind” (non humani generis proprium est). Consequently, they 
defined it as being the law „quod natura omnia animalia docuit” (that all beings 
have acquired from the nature). 
The same brilliant Roman jurisconsults stated that the fundamental juridical 
institutions themselves, as, for example, marriage, have their institutional basis in 
the natural law. From this „jus naturale”– they say – „maris atque feminae 
coniugatio” (the man`s unification with the woman), „quam nos matrimonium 
appellamus” (which we call marrige), and „liberorum procreatio et educatio” (the 
procreation of children and their education) follow (Just. Inst., lb. I, II). 
The educational process also finds its legal basis in this „jus naturale”, about which 
the jurisconsults of Emperor Justinian (527-565) said that „omnes gentes peraeque 
servantur” (it is equally respected by all peoples). 
The same Roman jurisconsults – led by the famous Tribonian – wanted to specify 
that this „jus naturale”, „divina quadam providentia constituta, semper firma atque 
immutabilia permanent: ea vero quae ipsa sibi quaeque civitas constituit, saepe 
mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi vel alia postea lege lata” (being 
established by a divine providence, remains firm and unchanged, whereas the laws 
that every city has established for itself can be changed either by the unspoken 
consent of the people or by another law). 
According to the Roman „jurisprudence”, the „persons`” (personarum) rights and 
liberties also have their source, their origin, in this „jus naturale”. As such, the 
respective rights and liberties of the human person must be respected and granted 
for eternity, as they cannot be changed or abrogated by a another law.  
But, how was „the freedom” (libertas) understood and defined in the texts of the 
classical jurists which, along the centuries, have been a main source of inspiration 
and reference for the theoreticians and practicians of law?! For the Roman 
jurisconsults, „libertas quidem est, ex qua etiam liberi vocantur, naturalis facultas 
eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi quid aut vi aut iure prohibetur” (freedom, on the 
basis of which (people) call themselves free, is the man`s natural capacity to do 
what he wants, unless being stopped by force or by the law) (Just. Inst., lb. I, III, 
1). 
Based on the precepts of the same „jus naturale”, the Roman jurisprudence 
considered that „servitus” (the servitude) is „contra naturam” (against nature), as, 
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according to „iure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur” (natural law, all people are 
born free). The same jurisconsults added the mention that „servitus” (servitude) 
was introduced „posteaquam iure gentium” (after the emergence of the law of the 
gentiles) (Just. Inst. lb. I, V, 1), namely of that law that has regulated the relations 
between gentiles, between the social groups of the gentilic society. 
Ever since the Antiquity, the juridical thinking has also expressed itself by 
„prudentium responsis” (the jurists` answers), by which were created those 
„pronouncements” about the nature and the finality of the law, that the Romans 
have defined by the notion of „juris prudentia” (jurisprudence). This one has been 
understood both as an act of knowledge of „divinarum atque humanarum rerum” 
(of the divine and human things), and as „iusti atque iniusti scientia” (the science 
of what is just and unjust) (Justiniani Institutiones, liber primus, I, 1). 
By the Romans – where „jus naturale” was understood and considered a law that 
all the beings, including the man, have acquired from the nature, – „jus” (the law) 
and „justitia” (the justice) have been perceived in an existential relation, of an 
osmotic, organic and intrinsical nature. Consequently, the Roman jurisconsults 
have defined „justitia” (justice) as a „constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum 
cuique tribuens” (constant and firm will to give everybody what they are entitled to 
get) (Just. Inst., lb. I). Therefore, it is of no surprise that, according to „juris 
praecepta” (the rules of law), the man must „honeste vivere” (live honestly), 
„alterum non laedere” (not harm another man) and „suum cuique tribuere” (give 
everybody what they deserve) (Just. Inst., lb. I, I, 3). 
Based on that „jurisprudentia”, the Roman judge was empowered to judge the 
cases of the litigants and to pronounce the sentence „ex bono et aequo” (according 
to the value of good and to that of equity) (Just. Inst., lb. IV, VI, 20). Therefore, the 
constant and firm will to give everybody what they deserved was not expressed in 
the name of a value with a preeminently juridical content, as we are dealing, in 
fact, with a value with a moral content, that is, with the value of good and with 
another one, of a juridical nature, namely the equity. Therefore, only through the 
assertion and common turning to good account of these two values could we 
administer „the justice”, which, for the Byzantine legislator is „a thing holier that 
all other” (The Nomocanon of Târgovişte, 1652). 
The fact that the law also has a „metaphysical sense” is, in fact, also confirmed by 
the idea that the Roman jurisconsult Scaevola stated through the centurion`s words: 
„fiat justitia pereat mundus” (the world would better disappear than the justice). In 
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this respect, this „metaphysical sense” of law and, ipso facto, of justice lies in the 
very values it pursues, namely, the materialization of the social good and the 
administration of justice, as a natural basis for the enforcement of both „jus 
naturale” and of „jus civile”. 
At the end of the XVI-th century and at the beginning of the XVII-th one, the 
School of Law at the Pontifical University of Salamanca was represented by a 
group of famous theologians, canonists and jurists, who were to play a major part 
both in the development of international law, and of the doctrine about the human 
rights. (Lochak, 2002, pp. 12-13) 
According to Vittoria (1480-1546) – one of the leaders of this School of 
Salamanca, promoter of the ideas of natural Law, – the human reason 
replaces/substitutes the objective observation of the Cosmos as a source of natural 
law, and the principles of law imposed by the human reason are universal and 
cannot be abrogated. Asking the States to respect the free circulation of people, of 
wares, the liberty to preach one`s own religious faith etc., Vittoria has turn the 
individuals into „a subiect of international law” (Lochak, 2002, p. 50). In other 
words, the human rights have been internationalised, and, ipso facto, the ground 
was prepared for the emergence and the strengthening of the international law of 
human rights. 
In his turn, Suarez – another great representative of the respective School of natural 
law – in his work, “De legibus ac Deo legislatore”, published in the year 1612, 
stated that the natural law is made up of natural laws which emanate from the will 
of God, but which can only be known by means of the reason instilled by the 
Creator in the man, and not by means of Revelation. 
For these oustanding leaders of the School of Salamanca, all people – irrespective 
of their faith and race – are entitled to the same rights as Christians. Regarding this 
reality, in his Lessons about the Indians (1539), Suarez stated that the Indians, for 
example, irrespective of their Paganism, have all the rights and preserve the dignity 
of the human person. Beyond doubt, through such statements, Suarez actually 
defended not only the natural rights of Indians, which had been oppressed by the 
Spanish colonists in the name of the Christian, Catholic, European civilization, but 
the human rights, too, which have also been enforced on a universal scale by the 
contribution of the main representatives of the Schools of natural Law.  
Referring to the contribution of Vittoria and Suarez (competent theologians, 
canonists and jurists), Danièle Lochak – expert in the philosophy of law – 
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observed, with good reason, that „the idea of a universal community based not on 
faith, but on the affiliation to the same nature and to the same human dignity – 
which could seem like a return to the sources of the Gospel but which, in the 
context of the age, is a fundamental theological mutation – gives to the human 
rights their authentical universality”1 (Agi & Cassin). In this sense, the great 
religions of the world themselves – as, for example, the three monotehistic 
religions (Mosaic, Christian and the religion of Islam) – were the ones that pointed 
out that common human nature, this Adamic belonging to a common Father, 
Aavraam, created and chosen by Jahve to be “the Father of all peoples”, hence the 
different ethnical and linguistic character, but, at the same time, the universal 
character of the human race, to which the „Holy Books” of the three monotheistic 
religions explicitely refer.  
The modern school of natural law – represented by Grotius (1583-1645) and 
Pufendorf (1642-1694) - has separated the natural law from its religious basis, only 
attaching it to the servitute of human reason. But, through such a conception they 
did not only contribute to the speeding up of the law`s secularization process, but 
of the separation of „jus sacrum” from „jus civile”, which was to give expression to 
the will of the city`s ruling class, ideologically expressed also by the texts of the 
state legislation. 
Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) and Locke (The second Treatise on Civil Government, 
1690) find the reference of this natural law in the originary (primary) natural state. 
But, they were to observe that, in this primary natural state, people enjoyed a weak 
exercise of their rights, as they were not governed by precise and clear laws, hence 
the necessity that people join, out of their own will, in an act of social contract, 
which consisted in their exclusive submission to the legislative power established 
with one consent and to the laws it emanated. Under the impact of this conception, 
in the year 1762, J.J. Rousseau was to revive to idea of the social contract, which 
he imposed as a “norma normans” of the human society. 
In the age of Iluminism, Montesquieu also grants full trust to the human reason, yet 
exalting the religious liberty and tolerance. 
For Voltaire, to be free means to know your rights and to defend them; that is why, 
for him, the liberty of thought and of expression remains the first of human 
liberties. But, the same Voltaire was one of those who circulated the idea according 
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 Annexe 3, p. 13. 
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to which the religious war can only be prevented “by the multiplication of sects”, 
and, ipso facto, tirany in mankind`s way towards civilisation (Voltaire, 1957, p. 
258). In fact, these ideas have been taken over, in a tale-quale manner, not only by 
the exaggerated rationalism of the XIX-th and XX-th centuries, but also by the 
followers of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, who saw religion as an obstacle on the 
path towards knowledge.  
The fact that religion is by itself, first of all, a source of knowledge is certified even 
by the text of the Genesis (the Creation), which makes a special reference to the 
“knowledge” in the phrase „the three of knowledge of good and evil” (Gen. 2, 17). 
Anyhow, this knowledge also has its opposite, which is „ignorance”, which took up 
a „luciferic” (Dură, 2006, p. 35) character since the moment when the Protoparents 
of mankind, Adam and Eve, no longer wanted to obey the divine order. In this 
sense, we could say that the ones who have disrespected or disrespect the human 
rights and liberties have also fallen into some kind of „luciferic ignorance”.  
The Bible tells us that to talk and to rule means to know. The same Holy Book - as 
the great personalities of mankind`s culture call it (Dostoievski, Goethe, Eminescu 
etc.) – tells us that God Himself adviced Adam, the mankind`s ancestor, to name 
His Creation (Fac. 2, 19). In this sense, by advicing Adam to name His Creation, 
God actually urged him to the act of knowledge, for the simple reason that the 
entities of nature, the entities of creation, respectively, could not be named without 
being correctly defined by a process of knowledge increasingly profound and more 
comprehensive... . Knowledge cannot be limited – a poet-teologian wrote – since 
the man was meant to always give new names to the new entities defined by the 
continuous improvement of instruments and investigation methods”. (Damian, 
2006, p. 11) 
The XX-th century – rightfully named „a century of extremes” (Hobsbawm, 
1999)– has not only spread an ideative, anti-human culture, that ended up in the 
justification of the atrocities of Auschwitz, but also a metaphysical one (Marrou, 
1978, p. 70), as it had been emphasized by the great European humanists. In this 
sense, this metaphisical culture itself can be both a revigorating source and a 
resurrectional impulse for the man of our days, which could culminate with the 
restoration of human dignity, both spiritual and earthly. 
In the opinion of some philosophers of law, of a Marxist orientation, natural Law 
must not be claimed as a basis for human rights, as „a natural law based on a 
complete deduction of the man`s unitary and unchangeable nature does not 
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correspond to the realities, in opposition to the historical and geographical 
relativism of Montesquieu” (Oppetit, 1999, p. 113). They consider, in fact, that the 
basis of human rights lies in the principle of the autonomy of conscience. Based on 
this principle, asserted by Kant, in matters of morals, every person is at the same 
time a legislator and a subject of law. Therefore, it is of no surprise that this 
individualism, principialised by Kant, was to be imposed by Western people even 
in some Protestant and Roman-Catholic churches. 
The State cannot intervene in matters of conscience. This reality was already 
expressed by Romans in the well-known phrase, “de internis non judicat praetor”, 
by which the separation principle of the two fields: the earthly and the religious one 
and, ipso facto, the autonomy of cults, was emphasized. That is why „… the 
legitimate violence that the State exerts stops before entering the threshold of the 
autonomy space” (Frydman & Haarscher, 1998, p. 105), as the State is not 
authorized to enter the field of conscience, including that of the religious life. In 
fact, the human rights – formulated at the end of the XVIII-th century by the 
American and French Revolutions and, then, revived and systematized in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950) – embody the very „guarantee of 
the principle of autonomy”, as a fundamental principle of the relations between the 
State and the Church. (Frydman & Haarscher, 1998, p. 105) 
In England, the Petition of Right - of 1628 – has forbidden the arbitrary arrests and 
laid the basis for the Habeas corpus Act of 1679. In its first article, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights – adopted by the Institute of international law, in its 
session of New York (Oct. 12, 1929) – also provided that „it is the duty of every 
state to recognise to any individual the right to life, to liberty, to property and to 
grant to all the inhabitants of its territory the full and complete protection of this 
right, irrespective of their nationality, sex, race, language or religion” (Agi & 
Cassin, 1998, p. 331). Article 2 of the same Declaration provided that că „it is the 
duty of every state to recognise to any of its individuals the right to the free 
exercise, both at a public and at a private level, of any faith, religion or religious 
conviction, the practice of which is not incompatible with the public order and with 
good manners”. Finally, Article 4 of the Declaration mentioned that the affiliation 
to a religion „does not authorize the States to refuse, to any of their citizens, their 
private and public rights, especially the admission to public education institutions 
and the practice of different economic activities, professions and occupations”. 
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At the Congress of Dijon of July, 1939, the League of Human Rights has brought 
an addendum to the Declaration of 1929, restating and specifying that „the human 
rights are universal, irrespective of a person`s sex, race, nation, religion or opinion. 
These rights, indefeasible and imprescriptible, are attached to the human being; 
they must be observed at any time and everywhere and assured against all forms of 
political and social oppression. The international protection of human rights must 
be universally organised and guaranteed, so that no state could refuse the exercise 
of these rights to a single human being living on its territory” (Art.1) (Agi & 
Cassin, 1998, p. 333). 
In the year 1934, „The National Conncil for Civil Liberties” (Lilly, 1984, pp. 1-19) 
was established in London, as an action directed against the violation of these 
liberties by the fascist regimes of that epoch.  
In the addendum to the Declaration of Human Rights of 1929 (New York), the 
League of Human Rights – gathered at the Congress of Dijon of July 1936 - 
specified that „the freedom of opinion requires that the press and all the other 
means for the expression of thinking be set free from the domination of the masters 
of the banks” (Agi & Cassin, 1998, p. 334)1. In addition, human rights must aim at 
the common good of all individuals and nations, which is of the whole mankind. In 
this explicite manner expressed itself the Congress of the League of Human Rights, 
convened in Dijon in July, 1936, for which „any nation has rights and duties 
towards the other nations together with which it makes up the Mankind. Organised 
in liberty, universal democracy must be the supreme aim of all nations” (Art. 9) On 
the same occasion, they specified that these human rights „only authorize a 
brotherly collaboration that would pursue the common good of Mankind, with a 
view to the respect of human dignity and of all civilisations” (Art. 10). 
In the year 1942, Jacques Maritain elaborated a Declaration on the Human Rights 
and the Natural Law, in which he presents „the rights of the human person” and 
„the rights of the civical person”. On the basis of his Declaration lie the principles 
of the Judeo-Christian teachings, of a Biblical origin, according to which the man – 
“who knows good and evil since the creation” (Gn. 3, 5) – is the man`s „brother” 
(Gn. 9, 5). This „fellow man” of the man has – through the act of his creation – 
both rights (Gn. 1, 26, 30) and obligations (Gn. 3, 3). 
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 Art. 7, Annexe 2. Déclaration des droits de l’homme elaboré par la Ligue des droits de l’homme 
(Congrès de Dijon, juillet 1939). 
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The religion of Jacques Maritain – namely the religion of the Old and of the New 
Testament – being a „historical religion, is based on the Revelation made by God, 
to certain people, in certain places and circumstances, ...”1. Therefore, it is of no 
surprise that, among „the human person`s rights”, Maritain mentioned also: „the 
right to pursue the eternal life after the path that the conscience has recognised as 
being traced by God”; „the right of the Church and of other religious communities 
to the free exercise of their spiritual activity”; „the right to pursue a religious 
vocation; the liberty of the religious orders and associations” etc. 
According to the philosopher Jacques Maritain, „the person`s value, her liberty, her 
rights, depend on the order of sacred things, bearing the hallmark of the Father of 
all beings … . The person has an absolute dignity, as she herself is in a direct 
relation with the Absolute, where she herself can find her complete fulfillment”. 
(Riquet, 1981, p. 63) 
So, for Maritain, any man is a “person” – not a ... “individual” – whose human 
„dignitas” (dignity) is absolute, as she is in a direct relation to her Creator, named 
by the philosopher „Absolute”. Moreover, according to the statement of the French 
philosopher, the human person can only find his „complete” „fulfillment” in her 
direct relationship with the „Absolute”, which the Judeans, Christians and Muslims 
call God (Jahve or Alah). 
As regards this „human dignity”, The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
provides that it „is inviolable”, and that „it must be respected and protected” (II-nd 
part, title I, Art. II-61). Establishing the right to „human dignity”, the fundamental 
law of the European Union`s States actually restated „one of the principles 
included in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, which 
was, in fact, also restated in the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
although this right „is not explicitly regulated in any of its articles”. (Gâlea, 
Dumitraşcu, & Morariu, 2005, p. 111) 
Reasserting the principle of secularity, The Declaration of the Rights and 
obligations of Man and of the Citizen, adopted in London by „France Libre” on 
August 14, 1943, provided that „all people are equaly free to practice the cult they 
have chosen or to practice none. The law shall establish no difference between the 
cults” (Art. 15). Secularity was thus understood in the terms of juridical assurance 
and protection of the man`s liberty to have and to practice a religious cult or not, 
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 La Bible de Jésusalem, translated under the directive of Biblical School of Jésusalem (1998). 
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and, at the same time, to grant, as the basis of the legal regime of cults, the 
principle of the equality of cults and not a separation between the State and the 
Cults or an elimination of the spiritual and religious values from the city, as some 
politicians and jurists have understood the status of secularity and as they still 
understand it. 
In a text, drafted and presented in London, on January 31, 1944, under the title The 
natural rights of the human being, they mentioned, first of all in the preamble 
itself, that „the human rights are based on the human nature, they cannot be 
confiscated or restrained” (Agi & Cassin, 1998, p. 343)1. In this sense, the right to 
have and to practice a religious cult in a free manner is also part of the human 
nature and therefore, this right too cannot be abrogated or restrained by somebody, 
but in case that the teachings and practices of the respective cult infringe on the 
Country`s Constitution, on the political order or on the good manners or prejudice 
the rights and liberties of others. 
The right to the Liberty of religious cults was also taken into consideration by the 
Declaration of London, of January 31, 1940, as a natural right of the human being 
(Art. 8). (Agi & Cassin, 1998, p. 344) 
The Project of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – presented by the 
U.N.O., on June 16, 1947, by Professor René Cassin, the representative of France 
in the ,, Editorial Board of the United Nations Human Rights Commission - 
provided that „the individual freedom of conscience, of faith and of thought is a 
sacred and absolute right. The public or private practice of a cult and the 
manifestations of religious convinctions can only be subject to the restrictions 
imposed with a view to public order, to morals or to another man`s rights and 
liberties” (Art. 20)2. (Agi & Cassin, 1998, p. 362) 
The same project of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – published in 
May 1947 by the General Secretariate of the United Nations - mentioned „the 
freedom of conscience, of faith and of public cult” (Art. 14)3. So, it made a clear 
distinction between the freedom of conscience, the freedom of faith and the 
freedom of public cult. In this sense, since that year, namely 1947, in the Countries 
falling under the domination of proletarian dictatorship – among them in Romania 
– this distinction was not made anymore. In fact, in România, the Constitutions of 
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 Annexe 5. 
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 Annexe 9, Document II. 
3
 Annexe 8. 
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1948, 1952 and 1965 explicitly referred only to the freedom of conscience, in the 
scope of which they included both the freedom of faith and the freedom of function 
of of the religious cults (cf. Art. 30). Unfortunately, we find a similar statement in 
the texts of the Constitution of 1991 and of the one coming into force on October 
29, 2003, where – under the generic term “freedom of conscience” – the following 
are included: „the freedom of thinking and opinion”, „the freedom of religious 
faiths”, „the freedom of conscience” and „the freedom of religious cults” (Art. 29). 
Beyond doubt, these notional ambiguities and imprecisions are due to the fact that 
the so-called „father”, (sic) or, better said, „fathers” of these Constitutions, of 1991 
and 2003, are still dependent upon the juridical doctrine of a Soviet origin, in the 
spirit of which they have been schooled and in the name of which they have 
practised law in our country for almost half of a century.  
Manifesting a vividly hostile attitude towards any reference both to the natural and 
religious law, and to the international norms, regarding the obligation to observe 
and to juridically protect human rights, the respective jurists, in Romania of the 
timespan 1947 to 1989, have also encroached upon the right to religious freedom, 
which is one of the sacred rights of the man, included in the text of international 
Documents, with legal binding force, among the fundamental human rights and 
liberties.  
The Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the French Consultative 
Commission on its session of April 10, 1948, also provided that „the personal 
freedom of thought and of conscience, the freedom to profess a faith or to change it 
represent some absolute and sacred rights” (Art. 15) (Agi & Cassin, 1998, p. 368). 
The same document, of 1948, provided that „one of the objectives of the United 
Nations is to accomplish international cooperation, developing and encouraging the 
observance of the human fundamental rights and liberties for everybody, 
irrespective of their race, sex, language or religion; …” (Préambule). 
In principle, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – adopted on December 9, 
1948, at Chaillot Palace, - was not meant to be dependent upon any confession of 
faith. Its aim was, indeed, to respect all the faiths and ideologies of the world. 
Nonetheless, the competent exegets of this Declaration found out that its inspirer, 
René Cassin (1887-1976), considered the very „Father of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”( Agi & Cassin, 1998, pp. 11-13), would have been „too attached 
to the values of his ancestral Judaism, which was actually rediscovered by the 
Christianity of his many friends and of his wife …, hence the conclusion that the 
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sources of the Declaration are no other than those of Judeo-Christianity”. (Riquet, 
1983, p. 63) 
We should not be surprised that the principles and values of the religious, Judeo-
Christian spirituality, lie – outspokenly or tacitly – at the basis of the Declarations 
regarding the assertion and the protection of human rights, since these represent the 
very sources of the European thinking and culture, of a humanistic origin, which 
have, in fact, also generated and strengthened the outlooks on life and on the man 
typical from the epoch of the Renaissance, of the Illuminism, of the French 
Revolution (1789) etc., reaching their apex with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, and with the Convention for the Defense of Human Rights 
of 1950. Finally, the fact that this „religious and humanistic heritage of Europe” is 
explicitly mentioned in the text „of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe”, adopted in June 2004, is shown by its very Preamble, which states, in an 
„expressis verbis” manner, that, indeed, from this Judeo-Christian „heritage”, of a 
humanistic origin, „developed the universal values, being represented by the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of man, of the democracy, as well as by the 
equality, the liberty and the state of law” (Preamble). 
In their comments to the text of this Preamble of the European „Constitution”, the 
Romanian competent constitutionalists have also rightfully observed that this text 
too, emphasizes both „the interest of citizens and of the civil society” for „the 
problem of religion”, and its reference to „the heritage of Christian values”, 
recognising, ipso facto „an obvious historical fact, the contribution of Christianity 
to the European civilization etc.” (Gâlea, Dumitraşcu, & Morariu, 2005, p. 13). 
That is why we consider that the opinions of those who required „the elimination of 
the reference to the Christian values” – or, more precisely, to the religious Judeo-
Christian values, which have laid the basis of the European humanistic identity, 
spirituality and culture and shaped them – „for the reason of the necessity of 
eliminating any possible interpretation in the sense of the discrimination of the 
persons of a Muslim or atheistic religion” (Gâlea, Dumitraşcu, & Morariu, 2005, p. 
13), do not only lack objectivity, but any historical basis, too.  
Any conaisseur of the doctrine of the Islamic religion knows that this Judeo-
Christian spiritual and religious „heritage”, is expressed – in a form or another – 
both in the text of the Koran and in the liturgical practice of the Muslim cult. That 
is why, in our opinion, an explicite reference – in the text of the Preamble of the 
European Constitution – also to the values of the Islamic religion would bring no 
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prejudice to the recognition of the immesurable contribution of the Mosaic and of 
the Christian religion to the European humanistic values, but, on the contrary, 
would better emphasize the constructive and efficient contribution of the three 
monotheistic religions to the shaping of the European identity, from a spiritual, 
religious and cultural point of view, in the name of some principles the content of 
which is marked by some ideas of a preeminently humanistic nature.  
As regards a so-called interpretation in the sense of discriminating the „atheistical” 
persons, we must say that these ones too cannot elude a historical, irefutable 
reality, namely this „cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe”, of a 
Judeo-Christian origin, as they were also born and raised in its spirit even then 
when they subjugate their faith to their own human reason.  
People are usually enfeoffed and indebted to the mentality they belong to. They can 
only escape this captive thinking by appealing both to the sacred and to the secular, 
hence the two manifestations of the human thinking and feeling: religiosity or non-
religiosity. Hence, in order to give Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what 
belongs to God, we think that the insertion of an addendum in the text of the future 
European Constitution is necessary, that would explicitly specify that, along the 
centuries, atheists have also brought their contribution, in their own way, to this 
„cultural and humanistic heritage of Europe”. This way – in our opinion – we could 
avoid some disputes triggered by sterile opinions, with no relation to the historical 
truth, which are only enfeoffed to some views of an ideological and party-minded 
or religious nature. 
As regards globalization – a product of the technological age – they said that „... it 
lacks its spiritual and vertical dimension, remaining a simple horizontal 
phenomenon, with a purely economical content” (Popescu, 2004, p. 35), and that it 
has „no relation to the most disturbing questions: the afterlife, the the 
transcendence, the redemption”, so that the metaphysicists have called it „a civic 
atheism, ...” (Popescu, 2004, p. 34). Of course, this statement is exaggerated, as 
there are many supporters of this globalization process who admit to having a 
religious faith (Judaic, Christian, Buddhist, Muslim etc.) or who are also creators of 
spiritual-religious values. 
An Indian philosopher, Daya Krishan, wrote that „The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as the largest part of the documents created by the United 
Nations, need a fundamental revision. The Declaration – he stated – is not only the 
product of a provincial point of view on this matter – namely of the Western point 
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of view – but, following from the World War II, it also incarnates the vision of the 
world typical of the winners, a vision it mainly tries to inoculate to their own 
profit” (Krishna, 1998, p. 151). The same philosopher concluded that the respective 
„path chosen by the Western countries is not necessarily the only one that the 
mankind can follow to make these rights respected …. It is high time - D. Krishna 
writes – that the institution the United Nations stopped being only an appendix of 
the West and really became representative to mankind”. (Krishna, 1998, p. 154) 
The fact that this “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” does not prove the 
appropriation and expression of a ecumenical, that is of a universal vision on 
human rights, is an.undoubtable truth. Indeed, we are far from finding, in its text, 
the wisdom of the Indian or Asian religious thinking or discourse. Its thinking only 
lies within the limits of natural law and of the cult of reason, imposed by the 
Century of Light and by the Revolution of 1789.  
However, by the assertion of this cult of reason, they neglected the religious (life) 
dimension of the present-day man and implicitly, that of God, who is „the last 
ubiquitous mistery” (Rybak, 1981, p. 70). In this sense, this excessive cult of the 
power of reason also made this “last ubiquitous mistery” remain unmentioned in 
the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The European Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 1950) was the „first 
international treaty” which transformed the principles stated by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (New York, 1948) „in a treaty which binds the 
contracting states” (Lepretch, 1992, pp. 28-29). Already in the Preamble of this 
Convention they mentioned that the respective signatory Governments, members of 
the Council of Europe, were indeed decided to take “... the first measures meant to 
ensure the collective granting of certain rights stated in the Universal Declaration, 
...” (Preamble). In fact, on the occasion of a State`s joining the Council of Europe, 
this one commits itself – among other – that „apart from other duties it takes, to 
observe the human rights defended by the European Convention on the matteri, 
namely to ensure, on a national scale, the observance of these rights and to 
contribute, on a European scale, to the fulfillment of their collective granting, 
established by the Convention”. (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 113) 
The same Convention provided, in its very first article, the obligation „of the high 
contracting parties” (des Hautes Parties contractantes) to recognise the rights and 
liberties defined in the I-st title of the present Convention „to any person (à toute 
personne) who is under their jurisdiction” (Art. 1). 
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The competent commentators tell us that the provisions of Article I of the 
Convention establish „... an international liability of the contracting states 
regarding the obligation to respect – under the control of the Court and of the 
Committee of Ministers as regards the enforcement.of its resolutions – the rights 
and liberties granted by the Convention”. (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 123) 
The Additional Protocol to the European Convention (Rome, 1950), signed up in 
Strasbourg on May 6, 1963, stated that by the establisment of the „European Court 
of Human Rights”, that „Court” was given the possibility „to offer „juridical 
consultancy regarding the problems pertaining to the interpretation of the 
Convention and of the Additional Protocols” (Protocol no. 2, art. 1, 1). This 
specification was subsequently restated in the text of Protocol no. 11, the 
provisions of which came into force on November 1, 1998. 
Therefore, any public or private institution, in the countries of the European Union 
and any European citizen can ask this „Court” to offer them doctrinary 
explanations, clarifications and specifications regarding the correct interpretation 
of the text of the European Convention on Human Rights and of its Additional 
Protocols.  
„The action of control” of the Council of Europe for the „prevention of the 
encroachment on human rights” is „more necessary than ever” (Drzemczewski, 
2000, pp. 385-428), and, as such, with the purpose of putting the fundamental 
rights` protection into practice a cooperation between „the Community Court”, „the 
national Jurisdictions” and „the European Court of Human Rights” (Pescatore, 
2003, pp. 151-159) is necessary. 
Among others, the Protocol to the General Agreement on the Immunities of the 
Council of Europe – drafted and signed in Strassbourg, on November 6, 1952 - 
stated that “... the priviledges, immunities and facilities are granted to the 
representative members not for their personal use, but with the purpose to 
safeguard the independent exercise of their functions within the Council of 
Europe” (Art. 5). 
Not long ago, „the rule regarding parliamentary immunity” was put into discussion, 
which interpellates some of the members of the Parliaments in the countries of the 
European Union in the light of the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Indeed, the priviledged status that the members of the Legislative 
Assembly enjoy in some E.U. countries (the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate), 
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making it impossible for them to be chased or arrested without the prior approval 
of the parliamentary body they belong to, made some of them think they could 
even allow themselves to encroach upon the human rights (Krenc, 2003, pp. 813-
821) by virtue of this parliamentary immunity, hence, therefore, the obligation of 
the States of the European Union to take the necessary measures – also according 
to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights – for the 
elimination of the possible infringements on or limitations to the content of these 
rights, in their effective exercise, made by these very representatives of the peoples 
in the Parliaments of the respective countries. 
On April 27, 1977, the European Assembly, Council and Commission adopted a 
common declaration, in which they underlined „the very great importance they put 
on the observance of the fundamental rights, as they mainly follow from the 
Constitutions of the Member States and from the European Convention for the 
Safeguarding of Human Rights and of Fundamental Liberties” (Art. 1). (Schutter et 
al., 2002, p. 443) 
In May 1989, the European Parliament adopted a „Declaration of the fundamental 
rights and liberties” (Schutter et al., 2002, pp. 433-441), by which it expressed „its 
strong desire to establish a basical instrument of the Community, having a binding 
juridical character and which to guarantee the fundamental rights”. (Schutter et al., 
2002, p. 434) 
The Preamble of the Declaration states that „… it is indispensable for Europe to 
assert the existence of a law community based on the respect of the human dignity 
and of the fundamental rights …” The Preamble also states that „… these rights 
follow, at the same time, from the treaties for the establishment of the European 
Communities, from the common constitutional traditions of the member States, 
from the European Convention for the Safeguarding of Human rights and of the 
Fundamental Liberties and from the international instruments in force and are 
developed by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities”. (Schutter et al., 2002, p. 435) 
The first Article of this Declaration provides that „human dignity is inviolable”, 
and Article 3 that „any discrimination based especially on race, colour, sex, 
language, religion …is forbidden”. Finally, Article 16 states that „the parents` right 
to ensure the education (of their children) according to their religious and 
philosophical convictions”. 
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The basic provisions stated by the European Convention of Human Rights were, 
thus, restated, in the wholeness of their content, also by the Declaration of the 
European Parliament in the month of May of the year 1989. To the civil and 
political rights – granted by the European Convention of Human Rights – they also 
added a “palette” of fundamental rights, pertaining to the economic and social 
field, regulated by the European Social Charter.  
The European Social Charter (Grevisse, 2001, pp. 3-9), also called the Turin 
Charter, that was signed in 1961 by the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
came into force in 1965. Its text, updated in 1996, came into force in the year 1999. 
As regards this social Charter – that Romania signed in Strasbourg, in May 1997, 
they said it „must be seen as a proof of understanding the request according to 
which the observance of human rights cannot co-exist with poverty, with 
discrimination in society and at the place of work, with the lack of housing, of 
social security and of medical assistance” (Zlătescu & Stoica, 1998, p. 4). Among 
the rights granted and protected by the social Charter are also the ones regarding 
„the migrant workers and their families” (cf. Art 18 şi 19), any form of social 
discrimination being forbidden (Vandamme, 2001, pp. 12-43), a thing which, of 
course, also refers to the prohibition of discrimination on reasons of religion or 
religious conviction. But, unfortunately, there is no clear provision in this sense, 
which shows that, indeed, „the social Europe is still to be built” (Pancracio, 2001, 
p. 194). In fact, in their comments on these articles, the Romanian experts in 
“Community Social law” (Ţinca, 2005, p. 11) do not make the slightest allusion to 
the right of the immigrant workers and of their families on matters of faith, religion 
or religious cult.  
In November 1968, the United Nations General Assembly ratified the Convention 
on the Imprescriptibilility of Crimes of War and of Against the Humanity. 
In December 1973, the same General Assembly adopted the Resolution 3074 
(XXVIII) referring to “The principles of international cooperation as regards the 
detection, the arresting, the extradition and the punishment of the individuals guilty 
of war crimes and of the crimes against the humanity”. On the basis of this U.N.O. 
Resolution, the persons who are guilty of these crimes must be chased, arrested, 
judged and punished. The Resolution also provided the States` obligation to 
„cooperate, with the purpose of identifying, arresting and judging the ones who 
have committed such crimes”, and to take „no legislative masure or of another kind 
that could prejudice the international obligations taken on as regards the 
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identification, arrest, handing over and punishment of the persons guilty of war 
crimes and of crimes against the humanity etc.” (Predescu, 2006, p. 135). 
This Resolution took into account the crime of genocide committed by the German 
Nazis not only against some ethnical or racial groups, but also against some 
religious groups. In fact, according to the provisions of Article II of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved and subject 
to ratification by the Resolution 260 A (III) of December 9, 1948 of the U.N. 
General Assembly, which came into force on January 12, 1951, genocide also 
means the action undertaken with the intention to destroy, partially or totally, a 
religious group (Predescu, 2006, p. 136), not only a national, ethnical or racial one.  
This reality is also provided by the Romanian Penal Code, which, in the category 
of the crime of genocide, also includes the action undertaken „with the purpose to 
destroy, totally or partially ... a religious group...” (Art. 357). According to the 
Romanian Penal code, the crimes of genocide are punished, „by imprisonement” 
and by „the interdiction of some rights” (Art. 357). 
On January 25, 1974, the Member States of the Council of Europe signed, in 
Strassbourg „The European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes”. The Preamble of this 
Convention stated that, for the signatory States, the respective „crimes against 
mankind are the most severe transgressions of the law” and that „the practices of 
war are a serious prejudice to human dignity”. At the same time, the respective 
Convention explicitly referred to „The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 9, 1948 (cf. Art. 1, 1), to „The Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field”, signed in Geneve, in the year 1949, to „The Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War”, also signed in Geneve, in the year 1949, and to 
„The Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, 
signed in the same year and in the same place, namely Geneve, in the year 1949 
(cf. Art. 1, par. 2 a). 
In the solving of several cases, both the International Court of Justice (of Hague) 
and the European Court of Justice explicitly referred to Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which established „two fundamental principles of 
any modern penal legislation: the principle of legal incrimination and its corollary 
– the principle of non-retroactivity of penal law – from this one being, however, 
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provided an exception in the second paragraph, namely, in the case of punishing 
some crimes which, at the moment when they were committed, irrespective of the 
existing national legal provisions of that time, were – a Romanian magistrate 
mentioned – „crimes, according to the general principles of law acknowledged by 
the civilised nations” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 572). 
For the Europan Court, the word „law”, used in the 1st Paragraph of Article 7, is 
the semantic equivalent of the notion of „law”, that can also be found in other 
provisions of the Convention, the interpretation and enforcement of which „depend 
on the practice of jurisdictional authorities”. That is why the jurists, the 
practicioners, wanted to specify that this term „comprises both the legal norms „of 
a legislative nature”, and the jurisprudential ones ...” (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 579), that is, 
those pertaining to the juridical interpretation.  
The imprescriptibility of the crimes against humanity was declared by the statute of 
the Nuremberg Trials, appended to the inter-allied agreement of August 8, 1945. In 
this regard, the European Court of Justice declared that the purpose of the 
provisions contained in Article 7, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, was just to specify that its text does not affect the laws adopted 
with regard to the crimes against humanity. (Bîrsan, 2005, p. 590) 
On July 17, 1998, the representatives of 159 States participating in the Conference 
of the United Nations, for the creation of an international penal court, adopted the 
statute of this jurisdiction in Rome. Among the actions which involve the penal 
international responsibility, the crimes against humanity are also mentioned. 
As regards Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, referring to the 
possibility of judging and punishing the person found guilty of committing some 
acts considered to be crimes against the humanity, the Romanian penalists, the 
competent ones, said that this one does not „contradict the principle of non-
retroactivity”, and that „the provision of the European Convention mentioned aims 
to prevent the commiting of some abominable crimes in the future, which prejudice 
the interests of the international community”  (Predescu, 2006, p. 134). 
So, these crimes against humanity - which involve the penal international 
responsibility, - are the ones against peace, against the humanity, war crimes, the 
crime of genocide and the crimes against human rights. (Cloşcă & Suceavă, 1995, 
p. 231) 
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In the doctrine of international law, these crimes – and, especially, war crimes and 
the crimes against humanity – are declared imprescriptible. As such, their 
perpetrators can be chased and judged at any time, „irrespective of the time that 
passed since they committed these crimes”. (Predescu, 2006, p. 135) 
Convened in Cologne, in June (3-4) 1999, the European Council decided on the 
drafting of a „Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. In its 
resolution, the European Council declared that „the observance of the fundamental 
rights is one of the founding principles of the European Union and the 
indispensable condition for its legitimacy”. It also stated that „in its jurisprudence, 
the European Court of Justice has confirmed and defined the Union`s obligation to 
respect the fundamental rights”. (Braibant, 2001, p. 277) 
At the meeting of Tampere (Oct. 15-16, 1999), the European Council established 
the componence of the working team for the drafting of “the Charter” (the heads of 
state and government of the 15 member Countries, representatives of the European 
Commission, of the European Parliament, of the national Parliaments and 
observers from the part of the two Courts of Justice). 
In the opening discourse of the Convention`s works (December 17, 1999), its 
President, Roman Herzog, declared that „it is a catalogue of fundamental rights, 
meant for the bodies of the European Union” (Braibant, 2001, p. 287). 
“The Charter”, which was presented to the Council of Europe on the session of 
Biarritz (Oct. 14, 2000), when in also came into effect, is also considered „an 
effective contribution to the constitutionalization of European Union`s law” 
(Dumont & van Drooghenbroeck, 2002, pp. 61-96). Therefore, the Charter is also 
considered – just as the Convention on Human Rights – a constitutional instrument. 
They said that the entry into force of the “Charter”of fundamental rights was 
followed by the strengthening of „the human rights protection in the European 
Union”, and that it “shall establish new relations between the Union and the States 
and will call for a tight cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and the European Court of Human Rights”. (Rigaux, 2002, pp. 261-
262) 
According to the mention in the “Charter`s” Preamble, the European Council had 
really drafted a „Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, by which 
it aimed at the recognition „of the rights, liberties and principles” which state these 
rights and „… to strenghten the protection of the fundamental rights in the light of 
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the society`s evolution, of social progress and of the scientifical and technological 
developments” (Preamble). 
The Preamble of the same “Charter” states that „the peoples of Europe, 
establishing an increasingly tighter bond between them, decided to share a pacifist 
future, based on common values”. (Braibant, 2001) 
Which are these common values? The Preamble of the “Charter” refers to „the 
spiritual and moral heritage” of the European Union, but mentions that this one is 
based „on the indivizible and universal values of human dignity, of freedom, 
equality and solidarity; …” Then, in order to specify, it adds that this Union „is 
based on the principle of democracy and on the principle of the law state”. That is 
why it „places the person at the heart of its action when it establishes the Union`s 
citizenship (la citoyennité de l’Union) and creates a space of freedom, security and 
justice”. At the same time, it mentions that the European Union „… grants the free 
movement of persons and the free circulation of goods, of services and of capitals, 
as well as the liberty to choose one`s domicile”. 
From the same Preamble we find out that „the present Charter restates, taking into 
account the competences and the duties of the Community and of the Union, as 
well as of the principle of subsidiarity, the rights which mainly follow from the 
constitutional traditions and from the common international obligations of the 
member States, of the Treaty on European Union and of the community treaties, of 
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and of the 
Fundamental Freedoms, of the social Charters adopted by the Community and by 
the Council of Europe, as well as by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European communities and of the European Court of Human Rights” (Preamble). 
(Braibant, 2001, pp. 71-72) 
The cultural and juridical construction of Europe has been and still is heavily 
influenced both by the Convention on human rights and by the “Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, the text of the Convention 
remains the main reference text, for the defense of human rights, in the Countries 
of the European Union. 
The renowned European constitutionalists noticed that, in some Countries of the 
European Union, „human rights most frequently have a supra-legislative status, as, 
for example, in France, in Belgium or in Spain, or only a legislative one, like in 
Germany, Italy or in the northern countries. Sometimes, these rights do not have 
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any internal status and, therefore, as a rule, they cannot be invoked before the 
internal judge as the Convention, although having been ratified, was not 
incorporated in the internal law. This is the case of Iceland, while the United 
Kingdom is finally on the point of adopting the texts that are necessary for its 
integration”. (Grewe & Oberdoff, 1999, p. 21) 
The same experts noticed that, in some countries of the European Union there isn`t 
a unique constitutional document. Hence, sometimes, the „formal” constitutional 
law and the „material” constitutional law overlap a little... On the contrary, for 
other countries, (Austria, Finland, Sweden), the constitution is made up of a 
plurality of documents, among which of some provisions which, even though are 
attached to the idea of material constitutional law, would, nonetheless, in other 
countries of continental Europe rather depend on some internal regulations, even 
on legislative provisions”. (Grewe & Oberdoff, 1999, p. 7) 
The same jurists noticed that „… today it is impossible to understand the internal 
law of the European Union`s member States without referring to community law or 
to the law of the European Convention on Human Rights”, and that „… the 
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht – the European constitutionalists write – 
allowed us to become acquainted with the importance of the national juridical 
systems, in particular, with that of the Constitutions” (Grewe & Oberdoff, 1999, p. 
7). In this sense, based on the text of these Constitutions of the member States of 
the European Union, we can also notice the extent to which the provisions of the 
Convention on Human Rights have been recepted and applied, including the ones 
regarding their juridical protection.  
The text of the project of the European Constitution, which was elaborated within a 
„Convention” of 105 membres, representing the bodies of the European Union, 
was examined and approved by the European Council convened in Thessaloniki 
(June 2003). First of all, on the meeting of Thessaloniky (June 2003), the European 
Council adopted the 59 articles of the project of the European Constitution and 
then examined the „Charter” of fundamental rights, adopted in December 2000 on 
the meeting of Nissa. The 105 members of the Convention – representing the 
bodies of the European Union – decided that the „Charter`s” text be revised in July 
2003, in order to enforce it. Afterwards, the text was re-examined and adopted in 
the autumn of the same year „by representatives of the Governments of the 
member States, reunited in an intergovernamental Conference in order to adopt a 
final text” (Grewe & Oberdoff, 1999, p. 7). The respective text, which, in fact, was 
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meant to be „The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, was 
inserted entirely in the Second Part of the European Constitution. 
The respective text - revised by the 25 member States of the European Union on 
October 15, 2003, during an intergovernmental Conference - was adopted in June 
2004 under the title „The treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. By this 
title, they tried the surpassing and the conciliation of some contradictory positions 
and the acceptance of an equitable solution. The main actors involved in the 
promotion „of the differences of position”, which were, on the one side, France and 
Germany and, on the other side, Spain and Poland, were in fact the ones who 
determied the non-adoption of the project for a Constitutional Treaty in December 
2003.  
From a formal point of view, the European Constitution „can be considered a 
treaty”, but, „from a substantial point of view, it represents a fundamental law 
indeed, – in the sense of the classical theory of constitutional law – an act 
regulating the ways how the power is exercised... ” (Gâlea, Dumitraşcu, & 
Morariu, 2005). Therefore, in this case, we are dealing with a constitutional act, 
bestowing individuality and coherence upon the European system of juridical 
order. 
On October 29, 2004, as a State participant in the Intergovernamental Commission, 
Romania also signed – through its representatives – the final Act of this 
Commission, which adopted the constitutional Treaty. Hence, our Country`s 
obligation to harmonize the text of its Constitution to that of the E.U. Constitution, 
a fact that – with certainty – will surely happen following Romania`s joining the 
European Union, in January 2007. 
„The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” provides that the European 
Union „is a space of freedom, security and justice, where the human fundamental 
rights are observed, where they take into account the diversity of the member 
states` traditions and juridical systems” (Art. III - 257 al. 1). 
Consequently, they also respect the diversity of member States` traditions and 
juridical systems in matters of justice. However, the denunciation of the 
Constitution`s infringement can be made by any of the member States. They can 
„refer that matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union, in case they 
consider that another member state did not fulfill one of the obligations which are 
incumbent upon it based on the Constitution” (Art. III - 361).  
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The same constitutional Treaty provides that „if the Court of Justice notices that a 
member state did not fulfill one of the obligations which are incumbent upon it 
based on the Constitution, this state must take all the necessary measures for the 
enforcement of the Court`s resolution” (Art. III - 362). 
By „The European Convention for the Defense of Human Rights” (Rome, 1950), 
„The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (Cologne, 1999) and 
„The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, they brought a definite and 
efficient contribution to the constitutionalization of the law of the European Union 
and, ipso facto, of the human fundamental rights and liberties, which were 
perceived and formulated by the European juridical thinking in the spirit of the 
content of the great humanistic principles, of social liberty and justice, stated since 
the Antiquity by various philosophical, religious, political and juridical systems. 
By the instrumentalization and constitutionalization of these human fundamental 
rights and liberties, the European juridical thinking has proven its humanistic 
propensity and has shown the extent to which it can adapt itself to the requirements 
our times.  
Reaching a real apex of its efforts, made for centuries, that is, to endow the human 
being, id est the human person, with the necessary instruments for the assertion and 
defense of its fundamental rights and liberties, this European juridical thinking also 
remains, beyond doubt, a first-hand source and reference for the juridical thinking 
elaborated in the Schools of Law of the member States of the European Union. In 
fact, not accidentally, a member State of the European Union is sued for the non-
observance of the obligation of reception and assertion of the principles of a 
European frame-law (Gâlea, Dumitraşcu, & Morariu, 2005, p. 342) in the text of a 
national law. In this sense, such a law – as, for example, the European Constitution, 
- refers mainly to the promotion and defense of the human fundamental rights and 
liberties.  
From the lines above, one can infer that the human rights and liberties have been a 
subject of thinking and reflection both for philosophers, theologians and jurists and 
for historians and politicians, hence the inter- and pluridisciplinary manner in 
which these problems, which have concerned the mankind since Antiquity, are 
approached.  
Is this regard, both the old religious and juridical texts and the European juridical 
handbooks, studies and treaties of our days, shall remain telling testimonies which, 
in fact, emphasize the European judirical thinking regarding the human rights and 
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liberties, expressed in its quintessence in the text of the Convention of Rome (of 
the year 1950), of „The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” 
(Nissa, 2000) and of the European Constitution (also adopted in Rome in the year 
2004). The fact that, in the context of the European thinking on the human rights 
and liberties, we are dealing with an evolutive process both with regard to its 
elaboration and expression by using an adequate juridical terminology and to its 
appropriation, dissemination and understanding among a large public – of different 
ideological, philosophical and religious orientations – is testified by the multiple 
approaches, observations and reflections left by the jurists of different Schools of 
Law, starting with the old ones of Athens, Rome, Beirut and Constantinople and 
ending up with the ones of our days, of Paris, Rome, Berlin, Bruxelles or London. 
From the „classical” handbook of law „Institutiones Justiniani”, – owed to the 
famous Schools of Roman Law of Beirut, Rome and Constantinople – to „The 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (Rome, 2004), the European 
juridical thinking has also gone a long and often hard way, as regards the defining 
and defense of the human fundamental rights and liberties.  
If the European juridical thinking has really undergone an evolutive process, this is 
mainly due to the Schools of Law in the Countries of the European Union, the 
contribution of which is also turned to good account by the ones in our Country, 
which, since January 1, 2007, is among the countries which have made the human 
rights and liberties their major preoccupation, hence our obligation to harmonize 
the Romanian legislation to the principles of the European Union`s legislation as 
soon as possible, so that, this way, the Romanian law could break forever with its 
past of the period 1948-1989 and enter, this way, the authentical space of the 
European juridical thinking, for which the man is the measure of all things.  
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